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18 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
19
20 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
21
22 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

23 12 RICHARD E. WILMSHURST,

24 C 07 3790 WHA

25 Plaintiff,

26 v.

27 15 MARRIOTT OF SAN FRANCISCO, SAM
28 SNOWDEN, IGNATIUS CHINN, WILLIAM
16 LOCKYER, BLAKE GRAHAM, LEE CAREAGA,
17 JOHN MARSH, and KISU YO AND DOES 1
18 THROUGH 100,

19 Defendants.

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28 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANTS IGNATIUS
CHINN, BLAKE GRAHAM, LEE CAREAGA, JOHN MARSH AND KISO YO FROM
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF (F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)); PROPOSED ORDER

29 Date: January 17, 2008
30 Time: 8:00 a.m.
31 Courtroom: 9
32 Judge: Honorable William H. Alsup

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 11 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 12 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 13 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

14 RICHARD E. WILMSHURST,

15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 MARRIOTT OF SAN FRANCISCO, SAM
 SNOWDEN, IGNATIUS CHINN, WILLIAM
 LOCKYER, BLAKE GRAHAM, LEE CAREAGA,
 JOHN MARSH, and KISU YO AND DOES 1
 THROUGH 100,

18 Defendants.

19 C 07 3790 WHA

20 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND
 MOTION TO DISMISS
 DEFENDANTS IGNATIUS
 CHINN, BLAKE GRAHAM,
 LEE CAREAGA, JOHN
 MARSH AND KISO YO
 FROM PLAINTIFF'S
 COMPLAINT;
 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
 AND AUTHORITIES IN
 SUPPORT THEREOF
 (F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6));
 PROPOSED ORDER**

21 Date: January 17, 2008
 Time: 8:00 a.m.
 Courtroom: 9
 Judge: Honorable William
 H. Alsup

22 TO PLAINTIFF RICHARD E. WILMSHURST

23 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 17, 2008, at 8:00 a.m., in the above-referenced
 24 Courtroom, defendants Ignatius Chinn, Blake Graham, Lee Careaga, John Marsh and Kiso Yo will
 25 move and hereby move the court, as follows: For an order dismissing defendants from plaintiff's
 26 complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the
 27 grounds that plaintiff's complaint does not allege facts sufficient to state a claim for violation of 42
 28

1 U.S.C. section 1983.

2 This motion shall be based upon this Notice, the Motion, the Memorandum of Points and
3 Authorities filed herewith and upon all pleadings and documents on file herein.

5 **MOTION TO DISMISS**

6 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the following grounds:

- 7 1. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
- 8 2. The complaint fails to state a claim against defendants upon which relief can be granted:
 - 9 A. The complaint does not comply with the most basic requirements of pleading.
 - 10 B. The complaint fails to state any recognizable claim against defendants.
 - 11 C. The complaint cannot be remedied, and should be dismissed without leave to amend.
- 12 3. Plaintiff cannot prove the elements of each civil rights claim against the named defendants:
 - 13 A. Plaintiff's First Amendment claim is inviable as there are no allegations that plaintiff
14 was even engaged in the act of free speech at the time of incident.
 - 15 B. Any Fourth Amendment claim is barred by qualified immunity.
 - 16 C. Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim is rather curious as there do not appear to be any
17 Fifth Amendment rights at issue.
 - 18 D. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims are equally
19 flawed as they are better framed, if at all, under the parameters of a Fourth Amendment
20 claim.

21 This motion is brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6) on the
22 grounds that plaintiff Richard E. Wilmhurst has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for
23 violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

24 WHEREFORE, defendants pray as follows:

- 25 1. That the complaint and each claim for relief alleged herein be dismissed as against
26 defendants Ignatius Chinn, Blake Graham, Lee Careaga, John Marsh and Kiso Yo;
- 27 2. That plaintiff be ordered to take nothing from moving defendants and;
- 28 3. For such other relief as the court deems just.

1 Dated: December 11, 2007

2 Respectfully submitted,

3 EDMUND G. BROWN JR.
4 Attorney General of the State of California

5 PAUL T. HAMMERNESS
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7 

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9 Deputy Attorney General

10 Attorneys for Defendants Ignatius Chinn, Blake Graham,
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

A. Parties; Nature Of Action; Plaintiff's Claim

This action stems from a June 29, 2005, incident that occurred at the yearly dinner of the Legal Community Against Violence at the Marriott Hotel on Fourth Street in San Francisco. (Complaint, p. 2.)

Plaintiff attended the dinner and was allegedly arrested by State law enforcement officials defendants Ignatius Chinn, Blake Graham, Lee Careaga, John Marsh and Kiso Yo. (Complaint, p. 3.)

Defendant William Lockyer was the Attorney General of the State of California at the time of this incident. He had no other involvement. (Complaint, p. 3.)

Plaintiff has brought a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claiming false arrest and excessive force. (Complaint, p. 4.)

Plaintiff claims his federal civil rights were violated in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Complaint, p. 4.)

B. Grounds For Motion

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

1. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

2. The complaint fails to state a claim against defendants upon which relief can be granted:

A. The complaint does not comply with the most basic requirements of pleading.

B. The complaint fails to state any recognizable claim against defendants.

C. The complaint cannot be remedied, and should be dismissed without leave to amend.

3. Plaintiff's cannot prove the elements of each civil rights claim against the named defendants:

A. Plaintiff's First Amendment claim is inviable as there are no allegations that plaintiff was even engaged in the act of free speech at the time of incident.

B. Any Fourth Amendment claim is barred by qualified immunity.

C. Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim is rather curious as there do not appear to be any Fifth Amendment rights at issue.

D. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims are equally flawed as they are better framed, if at all, under the parameters of a Fourth Amendment claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants bring this motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

6 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
7 section 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint, as well as reasonable
8 inferences to be drawn from them, and the court must construe the complaint in the light most
9 favorable to plaintiff. *N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan*, 792 F 2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); *Parks*
10 *School of Business, Inc. v. Symington*, 51 F. 3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). The court need not,
11 however, accept every allegation in the complaint as true; rather, the court will “examine whether
12 conclusory allegations follow from the description of the facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” *Holden*
13 *v. Hagogian*, 978 F. 2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). A complaint may be
14 dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient
15 facts under a cognizable legal theory. *Ballisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 901 F. 2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.
16 1988). A dismissal is inappropriate where “it appears beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can
17 prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.” *Conley v. Gibson*, 335 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L.
18 Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957); *accord Mescall v. Burrus*, 603 F. 2d 1266, 1269 (7th Cir. 1979).

ARGUMENT

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS

21 While for purposes of this Motion we must accept all facts as truthfully pled, the paucity of
22 allegations within the complaint compels the moving party to provide some indisputable facts to
23 allow for a contextual understanding of the matter at hand.

24 Apparently, plaintiff Wilmhurst was federally convicted in 2005 of possessing illegal weapons.
25 As a condition of his probation, Wilmhurst was ordered by the Court not to possess any weapons.
26 As he attended the dinner at issue herein, a dinner attended by numerous leaders including Attorney
27 General Lockyer and Mayor Newsom, he was identified as being on probation and was hand
28 searched. After finding and confiscating a large knife, law enforcement allowed plaintiff to attend

1 the dinner.

2 Later that evening, plaintiff became upset when his room was searched and one or more
 3 weapons was found. Plaintiff resisted as he was taken into custody for violation of his probation.

4 **Plaintiff filed this civil rights action on July 16, 2007, more than two-years after the June
 5 29, 2005 incident date.**

6 **I.**

7 **PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE TIME BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE
 8 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.**

9 Where the facts and date alleged establish a statute of limitations defense, a motion to dismiss
 10 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper. *Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.*, 614
 11 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that section 1983 actions in
 12 California are governed by the personal injury limitations period. *Del Percio v. Thornsley*, 877 F.2d
 13 785 (9th Cir. 1989); *Usher v. City of Los Angeles*, 828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987). Former California
 14 Code of Civil Procedure section 340(3) provides a 1-year limitations period for filing personal injury
 15 actions. Effective January 1, 2003, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is 2 years.
 16 (C.C.P. §335.1).

17 Plaintiff claims that on June 29, 2005, he was subject to an unlawful arrest and excessive force
 18 by State defendants. The Attorney General's Office has handled several suits filed by Mr.
 19 Wilmhurst indicating his familiarity with statute of limitations claim filing requirements. Plaintiff
 20 filed this complaint on July 16, 2007, more than two-years after the incident date and well after the
 21 statute of limitations expired. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims are time barred and should be
 22 dismissed.

23 **II.**

24 **THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST
 25 DEFENDANTS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.**

26 **A. The Complaint Does Not Comply With The Most Basic Requirements Of Pleading.**

27 The fundamental requirements of pleading in the federal courts are set in Rule 8 of the Federal
 28 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 8), which provides in part that: "A pleading which sets forth a claim

1 for relief...shall contain...a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
 2 to relief...." (Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 8 (a).)¹ "[A]ll that the Rules require is a 'short and plain
 3 statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
 4 grounds upon which it rests."

5 (*Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); *Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers*
 6 *Organizing Comm.*, 494 F.2d 541, 556 (9th Cir. 1974).) However, "[i]t is not enough to indicate
 7 merely that the plaintiff has a grievance but sufficient detail must be given so that the defendant, and
 8 the court, can obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining, and can see that there is some
 9 legal basis for recovery." (*Davis v. Passman*, 442 U.S. 228, 237-238, n.15 (1979) (citation
 10 omitted).) That is, a pleading must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and
 11 succinctly. (*Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency*, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).) A
 12 complaint that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 may be dismissed with prejudice.
 13 (*Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.*, 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981); *Washington v. Baenziger*,
 14 656 F. Supp. 1176, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1987).)

15 Plaintiff's complaint does not satisfy even these most fundamental requirements. There are a
 16 bare minimum of allegations. The complaint, therefore, not only fails to give defendants fair notice
 17 of plaintiff's claim, but also lacks any facts supporting a legal basis for recovery against defendants.

18 **B. The Complaint Fails To State Any Recognizable Claim Against Defendants.**

19 Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 12), a complaint will be
 20 dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted..." Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.,
 21 Rule 12 (b) (6). "A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for one of two reasons: (1) lack
 22 of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim." (*Robertson v.*
 23 *Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc.*, 749 F. 2d 530, 533-534 (9th Cir. 1984); *accord, Balistreri v. Pacifica*
 24 *Police Dept.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).) Admittedly, a pro se complaint will be held to a less
 25 stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. (*Jones*, 733 F.2d at 649.) Yet, a pro se
 26

27
 28 1. Rule 8 also provides that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and
 direct." (Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 8(e)(1).)

1 complaint will be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
 2 support of his or her claim which would entitle the plaintiff to judgment. (*Pena v. Gardner*, 976 F.2d
 3 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).) “However, ‘a liberal interpretation of a pro se civil rights complaint may
 4 not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” (*Id.* at 471; *Ivey v. Board of*
 5 *Regents of University of Alaska*, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).) Thus, a complaint that is vague,
 6 conclusionary, and general, and does not set forth any material facts in support of its allegations, is
 7 properly dismissed. (See, e.g., *North Star Intern v. Arizona Corporation Comm.*, 720 F.2d 578, 583
 8 (9th Cir. 1983); *Bergquist v. County of Cochise*, 806 F.2d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on
 9 other grounds in *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378 (1984).)

10 It is impossible to determine either the legal claims upon which recovery is sought or any
 11 factual basis for a claim against defendants. The complaint fails to meet even the most basic
 12 requirement of alleging a recognizable claim. Clearly, it is inherently flawed and beyond repair by
 13 any means of amendment.

14 It is a fundamental requirement of pleading practice that the plaintiff must make specific
 15 allegations of wrongdoing against each defendant. “A complaint must set forth the specific facts
 16 upon which plaintiff relies in claiming the liability of each defendant.” *Ryncarz v. Eikenberry*, 824
 17 F.Supp. 1493, 1503 (E.D. Wash 1993) (emphasis supplied).

18 This pleading standard is of particular importance in civil rights cases like this one given that
 19 there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under the Civil Rights Act. *Monell v.*
 20 *Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (Congress did not intend to impose section
 21 1983 liability on a person who does not “cause” or “participate in” a civil rights violation); *Palmer*
 22 *v. Sanderson*, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). A person deprives another of a constitutional
 23 right under section 1983 only if he “does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative
 24 acts”, or fails to perform a legally required duty which “causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff
 25 complains]”. *Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original).

26 Consistent with this specific pleading requirement, the court in *Pena v. Gardner*, 976 F.2d 469,
 27 471 (9th Cir. 1992), held that a prison inmate whose complaint presented only “generalized and vague
 28 allegations” that he was subjected to a digital rectal search without probable cause had failed to state

1 a section 1983 claim". Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights
 2 violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss". *Ibid.*, quoting *Ivey v. Board of*
 3 *Regents of Univ. of Alaska*, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). [The Court of Appeals upheld the
 4 district court's dismissal of the pro per plaintiff's complaint in *Pena* notwithstanding the rule of
 5 liberal construction which is applicable to a pro se section 1983 complaint. See *Estelle v. Gamble*,
 6 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); *Pena v. Gardner*, 976 F.2d at 471]

7 In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to meet this specificity requirement in his complaint in
 8 at least two respects. In the first place, his 1983 cause of action contains only the vaguest and most
 9 general allegations of wrongdoing by any of the defendants.

10 Moreover, plaintiff's complaint fails to allege which defendants committed the particular
 11 affirmative acts which deprived him of specific constitutional rights. Instead, he simply makes
 12 generalized allegations that defendants were collectively somehow responsible for each violation of
 13 his rights. The courts have been very critical of this kind of lazy, unspecific pleading of "collective
 14 guilt" in civil rights cases. See, e.g., *Caldwell v. City of Elwood*, 959 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1992);
 15 *Ryncarz v. Eikenberry*, 824 F.Supp. at 1503; *Shirey v. Bensalem Township*, 501 F.Supp. 1138, 1143
 16 (E.D. Pa. 1980), appeal dismissed, 663 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1981) (complaint failed to identify specific
 17 acts of specific defendants, simply lumping them all together, and was thus devoid of any allegations
 18 that would put individual defendants on notice of their alleged wrongdoing).

19 By failing to make specific factual allegations of wrongdoing against each defendant in this
 20 action, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cognizable section 1983 claim against the defendants for
 21 "causing" or "participating in" the deprivation of his civil rights, as required in this circuit. See *Leer*
 22 *v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d at 633. The complaint, therefore, cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. See *Ivey*
 23 *v. Board of Regents*, 673 F.2d at 268.

24 **C. The Complaint Cannot Be Remedied, And Should Be Dismissed Without Leave To
 Amend.**

26 As a general rule, a pro se litigant cannot be denied leave to amend his or her complaint unless
 27 it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. (*Karim-Panahi v.*
 28 *Los Angeles Police Dept.*, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).) "At the same time, futile amendments

1 should not be permitted.” (*Klamath Lake Pharmacy v. Klamath Medical Service Bureau*, 701 F.2d
 2 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983), citing *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178,
 3 182 (1962).) *Accord, Jones*, 733 F.2d at 650. Thus, the dismissal of severely deficient complaints
 4 without first permitting amendment has been upheld. (See, e.g., *Jones*, 733 F.2d at 650-651; *White*
 5 *v. United States*, 588 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1978).)

6 It is clear that the complaint cannot and will not be remedied by amendment. The complaint is
 7 utterly frivolous, but will nonetheless require the taxpayers of the State of California to incur
 8 significant expense if the action is allowed to proceed. The complaint should be dismissed without
 9 leave to amend as to defendants.

10 **III.**

11 **PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF EACH CIVIL
 12 RIGHTS CLAIM AGAINST THE NAMED DEFENDANTS.**

13 The federal Civil Rights Act provides a civil remedy against a person who, under color of state
 14 law, deprives another of federal rights cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a § 1983
 15 claim, the plaintiff must prove that each defendant, acting under color of state law, committed an act
 16 that deprived him of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the U.S. Constitution or the
 17 laws of the United States. *Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d 628, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1988). Section 1983 “is
 18 not itself a source of substantive rights” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights
 19 elsewhere conferred.” *Baker v. McCollan*, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979).

20 There is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under § 1983. *Monell v. Department of*
 21 *Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); *Palmer v. Sanderson*, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir.
 22 1993). A person deprives another of a constitutional right under § 1983 only if he “does an
 23 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts”, or fails to perform a legally required duty
 24 which “causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” *Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d at 633
 25 (emphasis in original).

26 “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and
 27 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are
 alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”

28 (*Ibid.* (emphasis added).)

1 **A. Plaintiff's First Amendment Claim Is Inviable As There Are No Allegations That Plaintiff
2 Was Even Engaged In The Act Of Free Speech At The Time Of Incident.**

3 Under the First Amendment, a citizen has the right to free expression. In order to prove that a
4 defendant deprived a plaintiff of his First Amendment right, the plaintiff must prove the following
5 additional elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

6 1. the plaintiff engaged in [speech] [other specified conduct] protected under the First Amendment;
7 2. the defendant took action against the plaintiff; and
8 3. the plaintiff's protected [speech] [conduct] [chilling the plaintiff's protected speech] was a
9 substantial or motivating factor for the defendant's action. (*Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury
10 Instructions; 9.10 Particular Rights-First Amendment- "Citizen Plaintiff"*)

11 Under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, a citizen has the right to be free
12 from governmental action taken to retaliate against the citizen's exercise of First Amendment rights
13 or to deter the citizen from exercising those rights in the future. *Sloman v. Tadlock*, 21 F.3d 1462,
14 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1994). "Although officials may constitutionally impose time, place, and manner
15 restrictions on political expression carried out on sidewalks and median strips, they may not
16 'discriminate in the regulation of expression on the basis of content of that expression.' ... 'State
17 action designed to retaliate against and chill political expression strikes at the very heart of the First
18 Amendment.'" *Id.* (citations omitted).

19 Thus, in order to demonstrate a First Amendment violation, a citizen plaintiff must provide
20 evidence showing that "by his actions [the defendant] deterred or chilled [the plaintiff's] political
21 speech and such deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor in [the defendant's] conduct." *Id.*
22 (quoted *Mendocino Env'l Ctr. v. Mendocino County*, 14 F.3d 457, 459-60 (9th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff
23 need not prove, however, that "his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed." *Mendocino Env'l
24 Center v. Mendocino County*, 192 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999). See also *Awabdy v. City of
25 Adelanto*, 368 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004).

26 In order to demonstrate a First Amendment violation, a plaintiff must provide evidence showing
27 that "by his actions [the defendant] deterred or chilled [the plaintiff's] political speech and such
28 deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor in [the defendant's] conduct." *Sloman v. Tadlock*,

1 21 F.3d 1462, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing *Mendocino Env'l Ctr.*, 14 F.3d at 464). [**45] While this
 2 statement might be read to suggest that a plaintiff must demonstrate that his speech was actually
 3 inhibited or suppressed, our description of the elements of a First Amendment claim in *Mendocino*,
 4 which *Sloman* cited for its standard, requires only a demonstration that defendants "intended to
 5 interfere with Bari and Cherney's First Amendment rights." *Mendocino Env'l Ctr.*, 14 F.3d at 464
 6 (emphasis added). Because it would be unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability for a First
 7 Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his protected
 8 activity, we conclude that the proper inquiry asks "whether an official's acts would chill or silence
 9 a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities." *Crawford-El v. Britton*, 320
 10 U.S. App. D.C. 150, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1273
 11 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). n32

12 Plaintiff does not allege he was precluded from attending the dinner. By all appearance, there
 13 could not have been a First Amendment violation as no First Amendment rights were even at issue.

14 **B. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Claim Is Barred By Qualified Immunity.**

15 The allegations fail to establish plaintiff's section 1983 claim that his arrest violated his Fourth
 16 Amendment rights. Even if probable cause for the arrest was found to be lacking, the defendants
 17 would be protected from section 1983 liability by qualified immunity.

18 State officials who carry out executive and administrative functions, including police officers,
 19 may assert the defense of qualified immunity when they are sued under section 1983. The qualified
 20 immunity doctrine protects government officials from civil liability under section 1983 "insofar as
 21 their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
 22 reasonable person would have known." *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The
 23 plaintiff shoulders the burden of proving that the rights he claims are "clearly established." *Brewster*
 24 *v. Board of Educ. of Lynwood U. School Dist.*, 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1998).

25 The Supreme Court has made clear that the protection provided by the qualified immunity is
 26 far-reaching. *Ibid.* Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who
 27 knowingly violate the law." *Malley v. Briggs*, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). This test "allows ample
 28 room for reasonable error" by the defendant. *Knox v. Southwest Airlines*, 124 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th

1 Cir. 1997). Thus, for example, law enforcement officers who “reasonably but mistakenly conclude
 2 that probable cause is present” when undertaking an arrest or search are entitled to the immunity.
 3 *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1986).

4 In determining whether public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from liability under
 5 section 1983, a district court must consider (1) whether the plaintiff has identified a specific
 6 constitutional right that has been allegedly violated, (2) whether that right was so clearly established
 7 as to alert a reasonable official to its parameters, and (3) whether a reasonable officer could have
 8 believed his or her conduct was lawful. *Sweaney v. Ada County*, 119 F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.
 9 1997).

10 In order for a right to be “clearly established” within the meaning of *Harlow*, “[t]he contours
 11 of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
 12 doing violates that right.” *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. at 640. “In other words, before being
 13 charged with monetary liability, public officials must be given clear notice that their conduct is
 14 unlawful.” *Brewster v. Board*, 149 F.3d at 977. In evaluating claims of qualified immunity, the
 15 courts must not view constitutional rights in the abstract but rather “in a more particularized, and
 16 hence more relevant, sense.” *Ibid.*, quoting *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. at 640.

17 Although defendants assert the evidence clearly demonstrates that all of the law enforcement
 18 actions in this case were supported by probable cause, if the Court should find otherwise that finding
 19 would not give rise to section 1983 liability. The defendants plainly did what competent, well-
 20 trained, reasonable law enforcement officials would have done under the same circumstances. In
 21 the face of plaintiff’s recent felony conviction for weapons possession, and his possession of
 22 weapons at a significant civic event, law enforcement performed their inescapable duties by
 23 enforcing the laws of this state.

24 Defendants’ conduct, in all respects, was reasonable and therefore not culpable under the law
 25 applicable to section 1983 claims of Fourth Amendment violations. Defendants are therefore
 26 entitled to qualified immunity.

27 **C. Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Claim Is Rather Curious As There Do Not Appear To Be
 28 Any Fifth Amendment Rights At Issue.**

1 Inverse condemnation is actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 as a violation of the Fifth
 2 Amendment's guaranty that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
 3 compensation. *Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency* (1979) 4440 US 391,
 4 399, 59 L Ed 2d 401, 409, 99 S Ct. 1171.

5 Recovery under section 1983 is available if a plaintiff's right against self-incrimination under
 6 the Fifth Amendment is violated. *Chavez v. Martinez* (2003) 538 US 760, 155 L Ed 2d 984, 123 S
 7 Ct. 1994.

8 In the case at hand, a Fifth Amendment claim appears fatally flawed as both woefully and
 9 obviously premature, suffering from problems as to both standing and context. What exactly would
 10 be plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim based on the facts as pled? Dismissal of this claim seems
 11 appropriate.

12 **D. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Claims Are Improper And Inviable.**

13 Plaintiff's claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation based on his alleged unlawful arrest
 14 must be dismissed. It is the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution that specifically
 15 protects a party from the alleged wrongs in effectuating searches and arrests warrants. In *Albright*
 16 *v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807 (1994), the Supreme Court held that:

17 “Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of
 18 constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that
 19 Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’, must
 20 be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” (*Albright, supra*, 510 U.S. at 273;
 114 S.Ct. at 813, citing *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865,
 1871 (1989).)

21 For claims asserting that law enforcement officers have engaged in wrongful conduct in the course
 22 of an investigatory stop, arrest or seizure of a citizen, the proper analysis is under the Fourth
 23 Amendment. *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). Accordingly,
 24 plaintiff's contention of a Fourteenth Amendment violation must be dismissed as to defendants as
 25 plaintiff's rights at issue in this lawsuit are more specifically addressed under the Fourth
 26 Amendment.

27 If one analyzes this matter from a Fourteenth Amendment perspective, the elements of a
 28 violation are still not present.

1 Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is flawed as the facts, as pled, show
 2 plaintiff has made no allegations that his due process rights have been violated.

3 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting a state from depriving a
 4 person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law "was intended to prevent government
 5 from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression." *DeShaney v. Winnebago*
 6 *County Dep't of Social Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). Substantive due process claims usually
 7 involve infringement of liberty interests. See *Youngberg v. Romeo*, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) – state
 8 under duty to protect involuntarily committed mental patients from each other.

9 Violations of procedural due process are also actionable under section 1983. A plaintiff must
 10 allege facts which show that a defendant has deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity secured
 11 by the Constitution and laws of the United States. "Conclusionary allegations, unsupported by facts,
 12 will be rejected as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act. [Citations omitted]."
 13 *Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency*, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

14 Plaintiff has made no allegations that his substantive due process rights were violated. As a
 15 parolee, he was subject to search and arrest for unlawful possession of weapons.

16 The United States Supreme Court has cautioned:

17 "It must be remembered that even if a state decision does deprive an individual
 18 of life or property, and even if that decision is erroneous, it does not necessarily
 19 follow that the decision violated that individual's right to due process"
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 fn. 9 (1980)."

20 In truth, there are no specific allegations of due process violations within plaintiff's complaint.

21 If one treats plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment allegation as an equal protection claim, plaintiff
 22 fails to allege any disparate treatment, much less that it was motivated by a discriminatory motive.

23 The essence of an equal protection claim based on invidious discrimination is that the action
 24 was taken with a discriminatory intent or purpose. *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing*
 25 *Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229,
 26 238-39, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Whether the action taken was taken with a
 27 discriminatory purpose "demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
 28 of intent as may be available". *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.*, 429 U.S. at 266,

1 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450. The impact of the action taken is not alone determinative of
 2 discriminatory purpose. *Arlington Heights*, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450. Even
 3 when that disparate impact is foreseeable, the plaintiff must show more to establish discriminatory
 4 intent. *Personnel Administration of Massachusetts v. Feeny*, 442 U.S. 256, 276, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60
 5 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); *David K. v. Lane*, 839 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1988). Intent, in the context of
 6 invidious discrimination, is more than an administrator's awareness of the consequences of his
 7 actions; an administrator must have "singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and
 8 selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing it adverse effects on an
 9 identifiable group." Emphasis added. *Shango v. Jurich*, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982).

10 The Supreme Court has offered four circumstantial evidentiary sources of evidence of intent:
 11 the historical background of the decision; the specific sequence of events leading to the challenged
 12 decision, particularly departures from the normal procedural sequence; and substantive departures
 13 from the norm. Finally, the history of the action taken may shed light on the motive behind it.
 14 *Arlington Heights*, 429 U.S. at 267-68, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450.

15 It is not enough, however, for the plaintiff to show that a particular action or decision was
 16 motivated in part by a discriminatory motive. Such a showing merely shifts the burden to the
 17 defendant to show the same decision would have been reached absent the discriminatory motive.
 18 *Arlington Heights*, 429 U.S. at 270, fn. 21, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450; *Knop v. Johnson*, 667
 19 F.Supp. 467, 501 (W.D. Mich. 1987).

20 Plaintiff's equal protection claim alleges no more than that he is denied equal protection. He
 21 does not allege that there is any disparate treatment, much less that it was motivated by a
 22 discriminatory motive.

23 Plaintiff has not alleged there was any drawing of any suspect classification or that such
 24 classifications interfered with any fundamental rights or that there were any classifications at all.
 25 Equal protection deals with "classifications" and legislative line drawings. *Rotunda, et al., Treatise*
 26 *on Constitution Law* (1986) 317.

27 Plaintiff has failed to make any allegation of defendants acting with a discriminatory intent.
 28 Plaintiff's allegations in no way rise to the level of an equal protection claim.

CONCLUSION

2 Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. While the rest of defendants'
3 arguments are equally pertinent, the case is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff's
4 complaint should be subject to immediate dismissal.

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Respectfully submitted,

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